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THE STATE OF UTAH

ROLF SALM,
Plaintiff-Petitioner,
Case No. 14504

-vsTHE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH,
Defendant.
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Clerk, Suoramo Court, LHah

ARGUMENT

There was a total lack of evidence upon which to
base an indictment.
The only statement made before the Grand Jury was
made by the alleged victim, Gayleen VanWagoner, in response
to the question

f,

Can you describe that other gentleman, please?".

(Assuming for their argument that the other gentleman was the
same as the person allegedly holding her)
as follows: !!Yes.
as Mr. Strehl.

That statement is

He was oh, probably about the same height

He was a thinner built person.

He had a very

large nose and I don't know why, but 1 guessed just unless they
are like this it seemed like his teeth were you know, decayed
in the front.

It looked like he hadn't shaved for maybe two
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days and he had quite a lot of hair.
curl."

It was just in a natural

This description could refer to many hundreds of per-

sons in the State of Utah alone.

The description in fact does

not match Rolf Salm, whose nose is only of average size, whose
teeth are not decayed in front, who is five inches shorter
than Mr. Strehl, who does not have any more hair than one would
expect on a man of his age, and whose hair is no more than
slightly curly.
§77-19-3 says "Evidence receivable.

-- In the investi-

gation of a«charge for the purpose of indictment the Grand Jury
must receive no other evidence than such as shall be given by
witnesses produced and sworn before them, or furnished by legal
documentary evidence, or the deposition of a witness as provided
in §77-1-8.

The Grand Jury must receive none but legal evidence,

and the best evidence in degree, to the exclusion of hearsay or
secondary evidence.11

The above statement of Gayleen VanWagoner

is the only evidence set out in the Bill of Particulars which
could qualify as receivable under §77-19-3.
The protections of §77-19-3 can only be guaranteed
to the Defendant by way of a Bill of Particulars.

There is no

other way a Defendant can ascertain if the evidence that the
Grand Jury received and based its indictment on was receivable
except through a Bill of Particulars provided by the prosecuting
attorney.

§77-19-3 also states that this evidence is the only

evidence the Grand Jury may receive.
The statement of Gayleen VanWagoner, which is the only
evidence received by the Grand Jury is in effect a total lack
-2-
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of evidence.
Total lack of evidence is ground of quashal of an
indictment.
§77-23-3: A motion for quashal is available only on
one or more of the following grounds.

(1)(e) That it appears

from a Bill of Particulars . . . that the Defendant did not
commit the offense.

An extremely literal reading of this

statute could lead to the interpretation that an indictment
could be quashed only if the Bill of Particulars contains affirmative evidence that the Defendant did not commit the offense.
This construction is totally unreasonable because it is virtually
inconceible*that a prosecutor would submit a Bill of Particulars
containing affirmative evidence that the Defendant did not
commit the offense.

In fact, under this construction anyone's

name could be substituted for the Defendant's and that person
would not qualify for quashal.
of the legislature.

This is clearly not the intent

The only reasonable intrepretation is that

a motion to quash is available if it appears from the Bill of
Particulars that there was no evidence against the Defendant or
a total lack of evidence.
This is strenghthened by the majority rule in the
United States. While it is clear that mere inadequacy of
evidence is not sufficient ground for quashing an indictment,
the weight of authority is that an indictment will be quashed
it there is a total lack of evidence upon which the indictment
can rest.

ff

It is a generally recognized rule that an indictment

will be quashed, dismissed, or set aside by the court on motion
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their reach will explain away the charge.11

There are no Utah

cases construing this statute, but the Supreme Court of
California has recently had occasion to consider a virtually
identical statutory provision.
§77-19-4. The grand jury shall not be
bound to hear evidence for the defendant; but
it is their duty to weigh all the evidence
submitted to them, and when they have reason
to believe that other evidence within their
reach will explain away the charge, they should
order such evidence to be produced, and for
that purpose may require the prosecuting attorney
to issue process for the witnesses.
§993.7 of the Penal Code of California.
"The grand jury is not required to hear evidence
for the defendant, but it shall weigh all the
evidence submitted to it, and when it has
reason to believe that other evidence within
its reach will explain away the charge, it
shall order the evidence to be produced, and
for that purpose may require the district
attorney to issue process for the witnesses."
In Johnson v. Superior Court of San Joaquin County
15 Cal. 3d 248, 539 P.2d 742, 124 Cal. Rptr. 32 (1975), the
court held that the district attorney is required to present
any evidence which may be exculpatory to the grand jury.

In

that case, the prosecution had originally proceeded by way of
information, and a preliminary hearing was held at which the
defendant presented evidence.

The magistrate resolved conflicts

in evidence in defendant's favor, and dismissed the information.
The district attorney thenx^ent before the grand jury and failed
to disclose evidence favorable to the defendant (most importantly,
the defendant's own testimony), of which he was aware.
The facts of Johnson v. Superior Court are virtually
identical to the present case.
-5-

In this case the prosecution
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of the accused where there is no evidence whatever before the
Grand Jury tending to support the charges contained on the
indictment."

41 Am.Jur. 2d 1028, (see also Annotation 31 ALR

1485 cases cited therein and late case service to that annotation) .
A consideration of the relevant policy factors also
indicates that Utah should adopt the majority rule.

To require

a Defendant to stand trial on a criminal indictment which is

•

totally unsupported by the evidence would subject him to an
exceedingly heavy burden of ignominy, expense and time (not to
mention possible interferences with his personal liberty) while
the State would receive no offsetting benefits.

In fact, such

proceedings-could be a serious detriment to the State, since
they are expensive, tend to further over-burden the judicial
system, and may increase public disrespect for the legal system.
In addition, quashing the indictment places no great
burden on the prosecution since the prosecution may still proceed
by information and is not precluded from getting another indictment if it can show grounds therefor.
The prosecutor knew of exculpatory evidence reasonably
tending to negate defendant's guilt and was obliged to inform
the Grand Jury of its nature and existence so that the Grand
Jury could exercise its power under §77-19-4 and order the evidence produced.
§77-19-4 while providing that a Grand Jury is not
required to hear the defendant's evidence, nevertheless places
upon the Grand Jury the "duty to weigh all the evidence

...

when they have reason to believe that other evidence within

-4-
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originally proceeded by way of information, and a preliminary
hearing was held at which the defendant presented evidence.
The judge resolved the conflicts in the defendant's favor
and dismissed the information.

The prosecutor then went before

the Grand Jury and failed to disclose evidence favorable to
the defendant (most importantly the defendant's own testimony),
of which he was aware.
In Johnson v. Superior Court the court reasoned that
if a prosecutor fails to inform the Grand Jury of evidence
facorable to the defendant, the Grand Jury's obligation to
order evidence produced which migh tend to explain away the
charge would"be impossible to fulfill since the Grand Jury is
usually unaware of the existence of evidence not presented to
it by the prosecutor.

As the court stated, "if the district

attorney does not bring exculpatory evidence to the attention
of the Grand Jury, the Jury is unlikely to learn of it. We
hold, therefore, that when a district attorney seeking an
indictment is aware of evidence reasonably tending to negate
guilt, he is to inform the Qrand Jury of its nature and existence
so that the Grand Jury may exercise its power under the statute
to order the evidence produced."
A total lack of evidence is grounds for quashal and
there was a total lack of evidence presented to the Grand Jury
in this case.

In addition> the failure of the prosecutor to

divulge exculpatory evidence to the Grand Jury is ground for
quashal.

Either of the above is sufficient to require a quashal

of the indictment, however, the district court refused to quash

-6-
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in the fact of both of these and, therefore, the Defendant
prays this court to grant a Writ of Prohibition against the
Third Judicial District Court or any other duly constituted
Court in the State of Utah, prohibiting any further proceedings
against Salm in Criminal Case No. 28321, State v. Strehl and
Salm.
DATED this /h

day of AprJJU-JLS76.

L. M. HAYNIE
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